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Contracts, Conditions, and the Clayton Act: Causes 
of Action Available to a Dealer Injured by 
an Exclusive-Dealing Arrangement 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although a seller may have many legitimate motives for engag-
ing in exclusive-dealing arrangements1-arrangements in which the 
buyer agrees not to deal in goods of the seller's competitors-two 
anticompetitive results are unavoidable: foreclosure of channels of 
sale to competitors and limitation of the buyers' freedom of choice.2 
With the express intent of advancing the public welfare through 
the preservation of free competition,3 the Congress of the United 
States enacted the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914.4 Section 3 of this 
Act5 provides that it shall be unlawful (1) to make a sale or contract 
for sale (2) on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the 
1. Presumably, a seller's primary motive for engaging in exclusive arrangements 
is to increase profits. Subsidiary motives may include desires to increase predictability, 
to utilize facilities more fully, to decrease overtime production and idle time, and to 
reduce inventory. Moreover, a seller may be able to eliminate cost incurred in the 
transfer of goods from one party to another through the use of exclusive arrange• 
ments. See Kessler &: Stern, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE 
L.J. I, 2-4 (1959). 
2. A buyer's freedom of choice is limited by an agreement to deal exclusively with 
a particular seller even though he voluntarily agrees to it. He is bound by the agree• 
ment to the extent that, regardless of his future wishes, he cannot purchase products 
sold by competitors of the seller. Thus, if the buyer expands his sales facilities or 
increases his volume by advertising, he can sell only the seller's product to these 
additional customers. In contrast, the dealer who has entered an agreement for a 
specific quantity of merchandise may apply competitive products to the additional sales 
that were created by his increased efforts. 
3. 51 CONG. REc. 9262 (1914) (remarks of Congressman McGillicuddy). Section 3 of 
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), has been characterized as designed to promote 
horizontal competition both among those who seek distributive outlets and between 
buyers and sellers. These two rather specific policies have not been uniformly recog-
nized. The A'ITORNEY GENERAL NATL. COMM. ON A.NnTRusr LAW, REPORT 136 (1955) 
intimates that a refused dealer should have a valid claim when his termination results 
from a defendant's pattern of selling exclusively to those who refrain from handling 
competitive goods. The Report attributes the fact that such suits have met with little 
success to a belief by the courts that § 3 is fundamentally designed to protect only the 
seller's competitors. More commonly, courts recognize the policy underlying the anti-
trust laws to be preservation of competition, a policy· under which both narrower 
policies would qualify. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150, 
220-22 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). 
4. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-14, 19-22, 27, 44; 29 
u.s.c. §§ 52-53 (1964). 
5. Section 3 provides in part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ••• to lease or make a 
sale or contract for sale of gooi:ls, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other 
commodities • . • for use, consumption, or resale • • • on the condition, agree-
ment, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal 
in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a 
competitor ••• where the effect ••• may be to substantially lessen competition or 
tend to create a monopoly •••• 
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964) [hereinafter § SJ. 
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purchasers not deal in the goods of a competitor of the seller6 
(3) when the effect of such an agreement may be substantially to 
lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.7 Section 4 of the 
Clayton Act provides, as an important corollary to section 3, that 
private parties injured as a result 0£8 a violation of section 3 are en-
titled to bring suit for treble damages.9 Despite the apparent clarity 
of these statutory provisions, the determination of the exact nature 
of the rights vested in a party injured by an exclusive-dealing ar-
rangement has consistently posed one of the most perplexing prob-
6. Section 3 applies whether the contract explicitly provides that the buyer shall 
deal exclusively with the seller or whether the agreement is a requirements contract 
designed to fulfill all the buyer's needs. Standard Oil Co. of California 8c Standard 
Stations, Inc. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 
312 U.S. 457 (1941); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 
(1922). The section also encompasses tying agreements-agreements that condition the 
sale of one commodity on the purchase of another. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 
371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I (1958); Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt 
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 
(1942). 
7. This economic aspect of § 3 has received its basic interpretation in two Supreme 
Court decisions. In Standard Oil of California 8c Standard Stations, Inc. v. United 
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), the Court rejected a detailed economic analysis of the 
conditions surrounding the exclusive-dealing arrangement and held that this "clause 
of section 3 is satisfied by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial 
share of the line of commerce affected." 337 U.S. at 314. This decision sparked severe 
criticism by many who felt that the "quantitative substantiality" test was too mechani-
cal for such a subtle and complex field. See, e.g., Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and 
the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, 1961 S. Cr. REv. 
267, 275-76. In 1961, the Court relaxed the vigor of the Standard Stations decision in 
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Co. 365 U.S. 320 (1961). In Tampa, the Court made 
the Standard Stations test a more flexible one that involves essentially a weighing of 
relevant factors. The Court considered "the relative strength of the parties, the pro-
portionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume of commerce 
in the relevant market areas, and the probable immediate and future effects which 
preemption of that share of the market might have on effective competition therein." 
365 U.S. at 329. Moreover, the Court was willing to consider the legitimate needs that 
might be served by exclusive dealing. 365 U.S. at 327-29. See generally M. HANDLER, 
ANTITRUsr IN PERSPECTIVE 29-48 (1957): Bodner, Antitrust Policy in Distribution:The Ex-
panded Prohibitions Against Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing: The Search 
for a Viable Legal Alternative, 37 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 759 (1968); Smith, Vertical 
Arrangements, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 18 (1963); Stoll, Exclusive Dealing Arrange-
ments and the Antitrust Law, 6 WILLIAMEITE L.J. 17 (1970). 
Section 3 also requires that the integrating firm, the seller, be engaged in interstate 
commerce and that the products in question be wares, merchandise, machinery, 
supplies, or other commodities for use, consumption, or resale. These requirements 
are rarely litigated and are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
8. The phrase "private parties injured as a result of" will be used in the early 
portions of this Comment to encompass anyone in the chain of causation. It will be 
shown later that damages are limited to those whose injury was "proximately" 
caused by defendant's violation. See pt. II. B. 2. infra. 
9. Section 4 provides in part: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in 
any district court ••• without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall re-
cover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a 
reasonable attorney's fees." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) [hereinafter § 4]. 
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lems in the federal antitrust Iaws.10 An example of the difficulties 
in this area is Allied Equipment Company v. Weber Engineered 
Products, lncorporated.11 
Allied Equipment Company (Allied), the plaintiff, was granted 
an exclusive distributorship in the farm equipment of Weber Engi-
neered Products, Incorporated (Weber) for a large portion of Vir-
ginia, and between 1949 and 1953, Allied handled such products 
exclusively. During this period, relying upon an anticipated contin-
uation of the business relationship, Allied incurred considerable 
expense in expanding wholesale facilities and establishing retail 
outlets for Weber equipment. In 1953, Allied notified Weber that 
it planned to handle competing lines _in the future. Weber 
threatened to cancel the distributorship if such a plan were effectu-
ated; when Allied refused to give up its intentions, "'\,Veber canceled 
the contract. Alleging that it had suffered damages because of an 
exclusive-dealing policy rendered illegal by section 3 of the Clayton 
Act, Allied brought a section 4 action. The Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, however, declined to recognize a valid claim for 
which relief could be granted: 
Allied faces a dilemma on the point. If there was no contract deny-
ing it the right to handle products competitive to Weber, there was 
no violation of the antitrust laws. If there was such a contract, as 
we have already pointed out the breach was by Allied and so no 
damages accrued to it.12 
Taken literally, the language of the court of appeals effectively de-
nies a cause of action to any dealer injured by a violation of sec-
tion 3. 
Although an extreme example, the Allied decision fairly repre-
sents the unsympathetic treatment generally accorded dealers-par-
ticularly terminated dealers-in the area of exclusive dealing.13 
While the excerpt from Allied stated that there must be a contract 
between the plaintiff and the defendant in order for there to be a 
IO. Kessler & Stern, supra note 1, at 21. The confusion has had important effects in 
other areas of the law. See, e.g., Macaulay, Changing a Continuing Relationship Be-
tween a Large Corporation and Those Who Deal with It: Automobile Manufacturers, 
Their Dealers and the Legal System, 1965 WIS. L. R.Ev. 483. In discussing the in-
equities that exist between small dealers and large manufacturers wielding coercive 
economic power, Professor Macaulay alludes to the fact that the use of private anti-
trust litigation to prevent such practices has met with little success. Id. at 506 n.70. 
Presumably, if private antitrust machinery could be utilized successfully, detailed and 
time-consuming efforts in other parts of the legal system would be unnecessary. 
11. 237 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1956). 
12. 237 F.2d at 883. 
13. See, e.g., Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Nelson Radio &: Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 
200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). The Nelson case is 
discussed in pt. II. B. I. infra. 
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violation of section 3, the court failed to specify precisely what led 
it to find such a requirement. It is the purpose of this Comment to 
re-examine two of the three requirements14 of section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act-with particular emphasis on the sale-or-contract-for-sale 
requirement-in an attempt to determine whether the formidable 
obstacle that judicial interpretation has made of these requirements 
is consistent with either the letter or spirit of the section. In discuss-
ing these requirements, this Comment will only consider the rights 
of parties who have at one time made purchases from a seller who 
utilizes exclusive-selling arrangements. 
II. REQUIREMENT OF A SALE OR CONTRACT FOR SALE 
In order to state a cause of action based on section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act, a plaintiff must first allege that there has been a sale or 
contract for sale. In examining this requirement, it is useful to di-
vide dealers who have been injured by exposure to exclusive-dealing 
arrangements into three categories according to the nature of the 
damages they seek. The first category consists of those dealers who 
at one time agreed to deal exclusively and who subsequently sue for 
the damages they incurred during the period of the illegal arrange-
ment. The second category includes those dealers who refused to 
purchase the seller's products exclusively and were subsequently ex-
posed to the refusal-to-deal sanction for such conduct; these dealers 
allege damages resulting from their terminations. Finally, there is a 
hybrid group of dealers who qualify under both of the above cate-
gories and who seek damages for both acts of the seller. The cause 
of action in this third category is best considered in its component 
parts, although some problems peculiar to such a hybrid suit will 
be discussed separately.15 Since the rights of a dealer seeking dam-
ages resulting from his exclusive contract with a defendant-seller are 
relatively clear, that category will be considered only briefly and the 
bulk of analysis will focus on the more confusing area involving the 
terminated dealer.16 
14 The requirements are stated in text at notes 5-7 supra. The third, or economic, 
test is beyond the scope of this work. For a discussion of it, see note 7 supra and 
sources cited therein. 
15. See notes 21-27 infra and accompanying text. 
16. Competitors of the seller may also sue under § 4 for damage resulting from 
exclusive-dealing arrangements. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). Although such suits are rare, 
the authority that exists seems clearly to establish the validity of a cause of action in 
these circumstances. See, e.g., McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 
332 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 834 (1960). Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil 
Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955). Although a plaintiff-competitor faces the same 
§ 3 and § 4 requirements as the terminated dealer, the competitor is in a somewhat 
better position because he alleges damage resulting from an existing contract or con-
tracts between the defendant and distributors; the refused dealer, on the other hand, 
must argue that his injury resulted from a termination that was related to a system 
of exclusive-dealing agreements. See pt. II. B. 2. infra. Thus, the competitor faces only 
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A. Dealer Who Sues for Damages Incurred During Period 
of Exclusive-Dealing Arrangement with the Defendant 
The dealer who at some point in time acquiesced in the seller's 
unlawful scheme would appear to meet the requirements of sec-
tion 3 since he seeks damages resulting from a contract or sale that 
was on the condition, agreement, or understanding that he deal ex-
clusively in the seller's products. Such dealers can be divided into 
two groups. The first group offers the clearest example of a plaintiff 
who is obviously entitled to sue-a dealer who continues to adhere to 
the illegal sale agreement at the time of the suit. Not surprisingly, 
few dealers have been willing to institute proceedings under such 
circumstances. The scarcity of such suits may be attributed to a 
number of factors. For example, the integrated dealer may be satis-
fied with the arrangement. Or he may feel that, although not neces-
sarily satisfied, he has suffered relatively little damage as a result of 
the agreement and that a lawsuit would therefore be economically 
infeasible. Finally, he may feel, though probably without cause, that 
a lawsuit would be barred by the seller's defense of in pari delicto.11 
evidentiary problems in establishing a contract or sale on condition, agreement, or un• 
derstanding. See note 18 infra. His principal difficulty lies in establishing proximate 
cause. The policy arguments that favor granting the refused dealer a cause of action, 
considered in text accompanying notes 61-87 infra, are generally applicable to the com• 
petitor as well. 
Direct support for a competitor's cause of action under §§ 3 and 4 of the Clayton 
Act is found in the Karseal case, supra. Plaintiff Karseal was a manufacturer of an 
automobile wax known as "Wax Seal." Richfield was a producer of petroleum 
products distributed to a large number of dealers along with other automotive parts 
and accessories. Prior to this suit, Richfield had been found guilty of violating § 3 
through the use of exclusive-dealing and tying arrangements in a suit brought by 
the Justice Department. United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. 
Cal. 1951), afjd. per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952). The plaintiff brought this suit for 
damages to his business resulting from one of the terms of the illegal agreements 
that prohibited dealers in Richfield products from purchasing automobile wax from 
competitors. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated the precise issue to be 
"whether Karseal's business is 'within that area of the economy which is endangered 
by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry.'" 221 F.2d at 362. 
The court first found that the gist of the violation was the restriction on the sale of 
competitive products. It then applied the target area theory of causation, discussed in 
notes 58-60 infra and accompanying text, and found that a competitor of the ex-
cluding manufacturer was not only hit but also specifically aimed at by the illegal 
conduct. 221 F .2d at 365. 
17. The defense of in pari delicto has been considerably limited in antitrust suits. 
See Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 390 U.S. 1891 (1967); 
Banana Distrib. Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (collect• 
ing authorities); Recent Development, 53 MINN. L. REv. 827 (1969); Recent Develop• 
ment, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 322 (1969). The courts have frequently disallowed the de• 
fense when it appears that the parties were not equally at fault. See, e.g., Harriman 
v. Northern Sec. Co., 197 U.S. 244 (1905) (seller used coercive tactics); Ring v. Spina, 
148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945) (economic coercion); Lehmann Trading Corp. v. J & H 
Stolow, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (seller used coercive tactics); Red Rock 
Bottlers, Inc. v. Red Rock Cola Co., 1953 Trade Cas. 68,856 (N.D. Ga.), revd. on other 
grounds, 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952) (one party appeared to have benefited more by 
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Nevertheless, those plaintiffs who have brought suit while dealing 
exclusively have easily fulfilled the procedural requirement18 of 
pleading a successful claim, since the contract required by section 3 
is still in existence for all to observe.19 
For similar reasons, it would appear that a dealer in the second 
group-one who temporarily acquiesced in an exclusive-dealing ar-
rangement and who, after changing his mind and refusing to con-
tinue to deal only with the seller, was subjected to the refusal-to-
deal sanction-would also have a valid claim at least with respect to 
damages incurred during the period of the agreement's operation.20 
In this respect, he is in the same position as the dealer who is still 
engaged in such operations at the time of suit, 21 hence some courts 
have recognized valid causes of action under these circumstances.22 
However, other courts have refused to allow such a claim, either be-
cause of a failure to distinguish between the two separable portions 
the illegal arrangement than the other party). The following statement from Ring 
is especially appropriate here: 
But here even without a showing of economic coercion ••• plaintiff is precisely 
the type of individual whom the Sherman Act seeks to protect from combina-
tions fashioned by others and offered to such individual as the only feasible 
method by which he may do business. Considerations of public policy demand 
court intervention in behalf of such person, even if technically he could be 
considered in pari delicto. 
148 F .2d at 653. 
18. Throughout this Comment the "procedural requirement" will refer to the re-
quirement that there be a sale or contract for sale in order to establish a cause of 
action under § 3 of the Clayton Act; the "substantive requirement" will refer to the 
necessity that there be a condition, agreement, or understanding. These terms have 
been selected because they best characterize the current plight of the refused dealer. 
Almost uniformly, failure to show the requisite contract or sale has resulted in the 
dismissal of a plaintiff's case at the directed-verdict stage. See, e.g., Nelson Radio &: 
Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 
(1953), discussed in pt. II. B. 1. infra. Thus, this requirement is labeled "procedural." 
Failure to show the existence of a condition, agreement, or understanding, on the 
other hand, is generally considered a failure of proof, resulting in a verdict for the 
defendant. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. FTC, 299 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 
1962) (discussed in text accompanying notes 119-20 infra). Thus, this element is 
more analogous to a substantive requirement. 
19. See, e.g., Libman v. Sun Oil Co., 127 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1954) (requirements 
contract); Red Rock Bottlers, Inc. v. Red Rock Cola Co., 1953 Trade Cas. 68,856 (N.D. 
Ga.), revd. on other grounds, 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952) (exclusive-dealing and tying 
contracts). 
20. See Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamms Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 
1968); Lessig v. Tidewater, 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); 
McElhenney v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 365 
U.S. 834 (1960); Campbell Distrib. Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523 (D. 
Md. 1962). But cf. Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber Engineered Prod., 237 F.2d 879 (4th 
Cir. 1956); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
348 U.S. 821 (1954). 
21. There is, however, a four-year statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1964). 
See also notes 51-53 infra and accompanying text. 
22. See, e.g., Lessig v. Tidewater, 327 F.2d 454 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 
U.S. 993 (1964); McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 
1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 834 (1960). 
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of the claim or because of an apparent general animosity toward 
such suits. The decision in Allied Equipment Company v. Weber 
Engineered Products, 23 considered earlier, exemplifies both deficien-
cies.24 Although the plaintiff in Allied claimed damage both before 
and after the termination, the court failed to discuss the two claims 
independently; it merely stated tersely that the plaintiff had no 
claim under any circumstances.25 Another court strictly interpreted 
imprecise pleadings in denying a terminated dealer's claim. Camp-
bell Distributing Company v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Company26 in-
volved facts similar to those in Allied-the plaintiff claimed that it 
had purchased beer exclusively from the defendant for over twenty 
years but was refused further purchases when it announced that it 
would no longer deal exclusively. The plaintiff alleged that it was 
injured as a result of the termination but failed to expand on the 
issue whether it had been damaged by the exclusive dealing for 
twenty years. Rather than examine the pleadings in an attempt to 
determine whether any claim had been presented by the facts al-
leged-in accordance with generally accepted procedure27-or grant 
the plaintiff leave to amend, the court granted summary judgment 
for the defendant on the ground that a mere refusal to deal does 
not violate section 3.28 
Despite cases like Allied and Campbell, the sounder approach 
suggests that a dealer who once operated under an exclusive-dealing 
agreement but who has subsequently been canceled should at least 
have a valid claim with respect to damages incurred during the pe-
riod of exclusive dealings. The mere fact that he was precluded 
from dealing with others during this period should provide suffi-
cient proof of the fact of damage to defeat a motion for a directed 
verdict and allow the dealer to present the substance of his claim. 
23. 237 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1956). See discussion in text accompanying notes 11 &: 12 
supra. 
24. See also Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
348 U.S. 821 (1954). 
25. See text at note 12 supra. 
26. 208 F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1962). 
27. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) ("[S]um-
mary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive 
and intent play leading roles • • • and hostile witnesses thicken the plot''); Conely 
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439, 443 
(8th Cir. 1964) ("[A] charge of antitrust violation, with daim of business injury there-
from, should generally be afforded the opportunity for proof to be made thereon, 
because of the aspect of public interest involved. Only where it is legally certain that 
the acts charged, in their rational implications, are incapable of constituting a violation 
of the antitrust laws [should the daim be dismissed]"); Clausen &: Sons, Inc. v. Theo. 
Hamms Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148, 153 (D.C. Minn. 1967) ("The general rule is 
that a claim should not be dismissed for insufficiency of statement unless it appears to 
a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts 
which could be proven in support of the claim''). 
28. 208 F. Supp. at 527. 
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In fact, most courts have been willing to recognize such a claim, and 
more recent cases indicate a marked trend in favor of the dealer.29 
There is a more subtle factor, however, that may influence the out-
come of such hybrid suits: a dealer in this situation may have in-
curred a substantial portion of his damages as a result of the refusal-
to-deal sanction and therefore may fail to impress upon the court 
the significance of the minimal damages incurred as a result of a 
previously existing arrangement. The possibility that the harm 
caused by the termination may substantially exceed the harm caused 
by the exclusive agreement demonstrates the importance of deter-
mining whether the refused dealer has a valid claim for damages 
resulting from cancellation. 
B. Dealer Who Sues for Damages Resulting from Termination 
for Failure To Consent to Exclusive-Dealing Arrangement 
I. The Nelson Case 
Courts have been reluctant to recognize valid causes of action 
for terminations for refusals to accede to exclusive arrangements. 
This reluctance is most clearly illustrated by the leading case of 
Nelson Radio b Supply Company v. Motorola, Incorporated.3° For 
several years prior to 1948, Nelson had been engaged in distributing 
Motorola products. During that year, Motorola submitted a whole-
sale distributor's contract to Nelson that required it to stop selling 
the products of any Motorola competitors; Motorola threatened to 
terminate the present contract and to refuse to make a new one if 
Nelson did not agree to the exclusive arrangement. Nelson, how-
ever, resisted these demands and, in 1949, Motorola terminated 
dealings with it. Nelson then sued under the provisions of sec-
tion 331 and alleged, inter alia, that Motorola had entered into 
agreements substantially similar to the one presented to Nelson 
with its other distributors throughout the United States; that had 
Nelson consented to these demands, it would have violated the anti-
trust laws; and that it was injured as a result of such actions. Nelson 
never enjoyed the opportunity of presenting the substance of its 
claim because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a split decision, 
held that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action.32 In 
29. See, e.g., cases cited in note 22 supra. 
!10. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). 
31. Plaintiff sued, alternatively, under § l of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(1964). For the requirements for a cause of action under that provision, see pt. IV 
infra. 
!12. The dissenting opinion of Rives, C.J., is instructive not only as a strong 
criticism of the court's action, but also as a premonition of future § 3 actions: 
Taking the averments to be true, as we must on motion to dismiss, a scheme 
has been devised by defendant's agents under which its dealers throughout the 
country have been coerced into entering into contracts in restraint of trade and 
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reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that section 3 prohib-
ited contracts or sales on condition, agreement, or understanding. 
In the court's opinion, a dealer who had been subjected to the 
refusal-to-deal sanction had not been involved in a contract or sale 
within the meaning of section 3. Moreover, the allegation that de-
fendant had entered similar arrangements with other distributors 
was of no relevance because, according to the court's interpretation 
of section 4, there was no proximate cause between such a course of 
conduct and plaintiff's injuries: 
[I]t is obvious that any injury to plaintiff's business is in no way the 
result of any agreements restricting distributors in other territories. 
That is to say, it is the absence of a contract with the plaintiff, not 
the presence of agreements with distributors in other parts of the 
country, of which the plaintiff must complain.33 
Nelson unfittingly became an important precedent for refusing 
causes of action to terminated dealers.34 Few courts were willing 
to challenge the reasoning in the opinion or to examine the case's 
somewhat unusual fact situation. Thus, the requirement that there 
be a sale or contract for sale proved to be a significant procedural 
barrier for private plaintiffs, and few suits reached the stage where 
it was necessary to prove the second, evidentiary portion of the sec-
tion 3 test-a condition, agreement or understanding.35 Thus, it is 
clear that the sale-or-contract-for-sale requirement lies at the heart 
of the refused dealer's problem. Courts have frequently directed a 
verdict for the defendant, based upon an assertion that the sale-or-
contract-for-sale requirement was not fulfilled, while failing to ar-
ticulate their precise reason for so doing. As the Nelson opinion in-
dicates, there are two overlapping grounds on which such a decision 
can be based. On the one hand, a court may imply an additional 
in clear violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act •••• The plaintiff refused to be 
so coerced with resulting cancellation of its franchise and destruction of its 
business. Yet the court now holds the plaintiff is remediless •••• At long last a 
method has been found to flout the purposes of the antitrust laws and to deny 
the victims any recourse to the courts. I cannot agree. • • • In short, I think if 
we apply to the amended complaint the rule of reason rather than the rule of 
form, it is entirely sufficient." 
200 F.2d at 916. An expression of similar concern with the results of the majority's 
holding appears in Kessler &: Stern, supra note I, at 84-85: "The Nelson decision 
raises grave problems of public policy. According to the interpretation of the anti-
trust laws adopted by the court, a refusal to deal with a dealer who has not acceded 
to the request for exclusivity is not actionable, even if it is a means of controlling 
a system of exclusive dealing which has anticompetitive effects." 
33. 200 F.2d at 915. 
34. See, e.g., Campbell Distrib. Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523 
(D. Md. 1962); Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber Engineered Prods., Inc., 237 F.2d 879 (4th 
Cir. 1956). 
35. See note 18 supra. 
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requirement into section 3-that the sale or contract for sale must 
be between the plaintiff and the defendant. Thus, under this the-
ory, the terminated plaintiff cannot plead a valid cause of action 
because he has not dealt with the defendant during the time period 
for which he seeks damages. However, such an implication is incon-
sistent with both the letter-which requires merely "a sale or con-
tract for sale" and not a sale or contract for sale involving the plain-
tiff-and spirit of section 3.36 Conversely, a court may interpret sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act, which enables private plaintiffs to bring 
treble-damage actions, as requiring a causal relationship-i.e., a 
dealer can only be proximately harmed by a violation of section 3 if 
he was a party to a prohibited sale or contract for sale-that cannot 
possibly embrace the terminated dealer. The second interpretation is 
frequently difficult to distinguish from the first, since both focus 
upon the sale-or-contract-for-sale issue. Under the second interpreta-
tion, it is not relevant that the defendant is currently selling to 
other dealers on an exclusive basis and that the plaintiff was termi-
nated for his refusal to join the arrangement because, as a matter of 
law, contracts with other dealers cannot proximately cause damage 
to the plaintiff. 
If this latter issue is the true basis on which courts have denied 
causes of action to terminated dealers-and, indeed, it would appear 
to be more sensible to address the issue as one of causation37-new 
concepts of proximate cause that have been developed in other areas 
of antitrust law should be examined. Moreover, useful analogies can 
be drawn from Sherman Act cases, because section 4 of the Clayton 
Act applies to both the Sherman and Clayton Acts.38 Thus, cases in 
which dealers sued for damages resulting from termination for fail-
ure to abide by resale price maintenance schemes39 or other arrange-
ments in violation of section I of the Sherman Act40 should serve as 
!16. For a discussion of the "spirit" of § l!, see pt. II. B. 3. a. infra. 
37. The Nelson court ultimately based its decision on causation. In dismissing the 
§ !I complaint, the court said, "The plaintiff has not been injured as a result of a con-
tract, either express or implied, which sought to prevent him from dealing in the 
goods of any competitor of the defendant." 200 F.2d at 916 (emphasis added). 
!18. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in part: "Any person who shall be in-
jured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws 
may sue therefor in any district court •••• " 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (emphasis added). 
!19. Resale price maintenance schemes-which involve agreements whereby retailers 
or wholesalers are bound to observe resale prices fixed by the manufacturer-are il-
legal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). See, e.g., United States v. 
Parke, Davis Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
40. Section I of the Sherman Act provides in part: "Every contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal • • • ." 
15 U.S.C. § I (1964). The possibility of suit under the monopoly provisions of § 2 
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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forceful precedent for the exclusive-dealing situation, since plaintiffs 
in both situations should face an identical section 4 proximate-cause 
requirement. 
2. Proximate Cause 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which authorizes private antitrust 
suits and provides for treble damages to injured parties,41 has been 
interpreted as imposing a rather significant barrier for private liti-
gants in the form of a threefold test. Although the section literally 
requires merely that the plaintiff "be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws,"42 
the courts have interpreted this language to include a rather strin-
gent proximate-cause requirement in addition to the obvious re-
quirements that there be a violation of the antitrust laws and that 
the plaintiff be injured.43 The effect of such an interpretation was 
apparent in Nelson, which appears to be the first case in the area of 
exclusive dealing in which a court was willing to direct a verdict on 
the grounds that a plaintiff had failed to allege a sufficient causal re-
lationship between the violation by the defendant and the injury to 
the plaintiff.44 
The decision that an injury is or is not proximately caused merely 
represents a conclusion that the plaintiff should not be covered by the 
statute; stated another way, it involves a decision to break a possibly 
infinite chain of causation at some point.45 Therefore, it is more ap-
41. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). Private litigants are also empowered to sue for an 
injunction against violations of the antitrust laws pursuant to § 16 of the Clayton 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964), but such an action would be, in a practical sense, of little 
value to the dealer in the situation under discussion. If the potential plaintiff is 
currently dealing exclusively with one seller, he is unlikely to sue, because he fears 
economic reprisal, because he has suffered little actual damage to date, or because he 
is satisfied with the arrangement. I£ the dealer has already been terminated for 
failure to cooperate in such a scheme, an injunction will not remedy that termination. 
42. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (emphasis added). 
43. The following discussion is limited to the problem of alleging a sufficient causal 
connection between the alleged injury and the violation in order to establish a claim. 
To recover, a private litigant suing under the provisions of § 4 must also, however, 
prove pecuniary injury "in fact" to his business or property. See Pollack, Standing To 
Sue, Remoteness of Injury and the Passing on Doctrine, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 
6-7 (1966). 
44. Although Nelson appears to have been the first case in which a court delineated 
the relationship of proximate cause in § 3 violations, the proximate-cause requirement 
for private litigants suing pursuant to § 4 had existed for over sixty years. See Loeb v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910); Ames v. American Tel. &: Tel. 
Co., 166 F. 820 (D. Mass. 1909). The requirement has been variously character-
ized as "proximate cause" and as "standing to sue." See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 43; 
Note, Standing To Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 
COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964). 
45. See L. GREEN, THE RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 122-23 (1927); w. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 41, at 240-41 (3d ed. 1964); Cohen, Field Theory and 
Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 251-59 (1950); Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. 
R.Ev. 211, 343-52 (1924). 
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propriate to address the issue in terms of the policies underlying 
sections 3 and 4, rather than discussing the "closeness" or "remote-
ness" of an injury.46 Such an approach is particularly appropriate 
in the case of section 4, which speaks of causation in extremely 
broad terms.47 By imposing a stringent interpretation of cause, 
thereby eliminating the refused dealer as a plaintiff, the Nelson 
court implied an additional requirement into section 3 that severely 
limits that provision's scope. 
It is unfitting that the analysis of proximate cause in the Nelson 
case has continued to have great judicial weight. For neither the 
Nelson decision nor many of the decisions that followed it have 
taken account of the elaborate body of law that has recently devel-
oped concerning proximate cause in the area of antitrust law.48 
Moreover, the pleadings in the Nelson case were unusual, and the 
decision may be distinguished from similar cases. The court ap-
peared to rely heavily on the broad language of the pleadings and 
the fact situation it seemed to represent. In trying to establish a 
causal connection between Motorola's over-all policy of exclusive 
dealing and the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff, according to the 
court, merely alleged "that the defendant is selling and shipping 
Motorola merchandise to its other distributors throughout the 
United States under distributor agreements substantially the 
same"49 as the one that the defendant attempted to impose on the 
plaintiff. In response to this allegation, the court stated that "it is 
obvious that any injury to plaintiff's business is in no way the result 
of any agreements restricting distributors in other territories."50 
Thus, it is possible that the indiscriminate wording of the com-
plaint and the failure of the plaintiff to define more precisely the 
relationship between other dealers and itself led the court to the 
conclusion that there was no cause of action presented. 
46. w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 283 (3d ed. 1964); Note, 
Proximate Cause as a Limitation on the Scope of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 44 
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 160, 161 (1966). 
47. "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ••• .'' 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) 
(emphasis added). 
48. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 
377 U.S. 13 (1964). 
It is beyond the scope of this work to discuss proximate cause, as it relates to 
antitrust law, in depth. It will only be considered to the extent applicable to exclu-
sive dealing. For a more detailed analysis, see generally E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL 
TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS §§ 4.01-.ll, 20.01-.06 (1965); Pollack, The "Injury" 
and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 
691 (1963); Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in 
Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 231 (1961); 
Comment, Legal Cause in Treble Damage Actions Under the Clayton Act, 27 MD. L. 
R.Ev. 275 (1967). 
49. 200 F.2d 9II, 913 (5th Cir. 1952) (emphasis added). 
50. 200 F.2d at 915 (emphasis added). 
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Since the result in Nelson may be at least partially attributable 
to the plaintiff's defective pleading, it would be worthwhile to take 
a fresh look at the proximate-cause issue. Theoretically, cause 
should be relatively easy to establish in section 3 actions brought 
by terminated dealers. Consider a situation in which a plaintiff and 
three other dealers compete in the distribution of XYZ products in 
a market area that is highly profitable to XYZ Company. Each of 
the four dealers derives approximately seventy-five per cent of his 
profits from the distribution of XYZ products and twenty-five per 
cent from the distribution of products of a competitor of XYZ. Each 
of the plaintiff's three competitors then accedes to XYZ's demands 
to enter into exclusive-dealing arrangements, and XYZ threatens to 
terminate the plaintiff if he does not also acquiesce. The plaintiff is 
left with two choices: he may agree to the plan and lose the twenty-
five per cent of his profits that is attributable to sales of non-XYZ 
products, or he may refuse to enter into the arrangement and 
thereby lose the seventy-five per cent of his profits that is attribut-
able to sales of XYZ products. Thus, he is injured, in fact, by either 
alternative to the extent of lost profits.51 Proving proximate cause-
that the injury to the plaintiff is proximately caused by the defen-
dant's violation of section 3-requires only one additional concep-
tual step. Consider a hypothetical case similar to the one above, in 
which XYZ has four distributors of roughly equal size and seventy-
five per cent of each distributor's sales consists of XYZ products. 
Dealer A is unlikely to be swayed by XYZ's threats of refusal to deal 
as long as dealers B, C, and D have not acceded, since he realizes 
that XYZ would lose one-fourth of its sales if it canceled A. For the 
same reason, XYZ is unlikely to cancel A. If B agrees to deal exclu-
sively, however, it becomes more feasible for XYZ to threaten and 
cancel A, because B's increased efforts in handling XYZ's products 
will partially offset the losses incurred if A is terminated. ·when C 
and D acquiesce, XYZ will not hesitate to refuse to deal with A be-
cause the combined efforts of B, C, and D will probably make up 
for the lost sales formerly made by A. Thus, the sales or contracts to 
sell to other dealers directly harm the refused dealer, because they 
make it feasible for the seller to impose the refusal-to-deal sanction, 
which deprives the refused dealer of a large share of his profits. 
Passing from the realm of simple hypotheticals to the real economy 
does not alter the basic argument. It is not A's knowledge of XYZ's 
exclusive-dealing agreements with other distributors that is impor-
51. It is realistic to assume that in either situation, by stocking more inventory, 
specializing in fewer products, using more intensive advertising, etc., the dealer could 
increase sales of the products he is still selling above the level that prevailed for 
each item when he was handling several lines. However, it is unlikely that he could 
increase his total sales to the previous level, and even if he could, his profit level might 
be much less than previously. 
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tant: 112 the mere existence of such agreements gives XYZ the eco-
nomic leverage to threaten to cancel and ultimately to cancel A 
without inflicting substantial damage on itself. In sum, it can be 
seen that the harm resulting from a dealer's termination for refus-
ing to accede to an exclusive-dealing arrangement is causally re-
lated to the seller's violation of section 3 by entering into exclusive 
agreements with other dealers. 
That there is a close relationship between the terminated deal-
er's injury and the seller's section 3 violation is supported by a recent 
decision in a related area of antitrust law, in which the Supreme 
Court was willing to interpret the proximate-cause requirement of 
section 4 in a manner favorable to the refused dealer. In Simpson v. 
Union Oil Company,53 the plaintiff contended that he had been 
terminated by Union Oil for failure to abide by a resale price main-
tenance system abhorrent to section I of the Sherman Act, 114 that 
leases and agreements that were conditioned upon the dealer's ad-
herence to a price-fixing scheme were currently utilized by the de-
fendant in its arrangements with numerous other dealers, and that 
the plaintiff was harmed as a result of his cancellation for refusal to 
adhere to the illegal arrangement. In reversing summary judgment 
granted for the defendant, the Court had little trouble finding prox-
imate cause: 
If the ... agreement achieves resale price maintenance in violation 
of the Sherman Act, it and the lease are being used to injure inter-
state commerce by depriving independent dealers of the exer-
cise of free judgment .... The fact that a retailer can refuse to deal 
does not give the supplier immunity if the arrangement is one of 
those schemes condemned by the antitrust laws. There is actionable 
wrong whenever the restraint of trade or monopolistic practice has 
an impact on the market; and it matters not that the complainant 
may be only one merchant.511 
52. Indeed, the fact that knowledge is unimportant in the real world may easily 
be demonstrated by examining the classic model of the Prisoner's Dilemma. X and Y 
commit a crime to which there are no known witnesses. Immediately afterward they 
are captured and placed in two separate rooms. The district attorney tells X that if 
he confesses and thereby implicates Y, he will get a short sentence. However, if he 
does not confess but Y does, then Y will get the short sentence and X the long one. X 
now faces the dilemma. He knows that both he and Y will go free if neither confesses. 
He also knows, however, that the risk of silence is great, for if he refuses to confess but 
Y breaks down, he will get the worst possible sentence. X has no choice but to con-
fess on the assumption that Y will confess, thereby minimizing his risk. The dealer 
offered an exclusive-dealing contract is in much the same position. He must assume 
that other dealers have acquiesced-unless the seller deals with so few buyers that 
the dealer can actually confirm his assumptions. Thus, the seller's threat is a viable 
one, and, for purposes of the effect on any one dealer, knowledge should be an unnec-
essary ingredient of a terminated dealer's § 3 action. 
53. 377 U.S. 13 (1964). 
54. See note 39 supra. 
55. 377 U.S. at 16. 
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It is thus clear that at least in the Sherman Act context of resale 
price maintenance, the Court will recognize a cause of action for a 
terminated dealer when the dealer alleges that his cancellation was 
part of a broader scheme designed to violate the antitrust laws. 
Since section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a private cause of action 
for injuries caused "by reason of anything forbidden by the anti-
trust laws," the same proximate-cause requirement should be ap-
plied to section I of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton 
Act. Therefore, the Simpson analysis should enable a dealer termi-
nated for refusing to accede to an exclusive-dealing arrangement to 
state a valid cause of action under section 3. 
Traditionally, when faced with a proximate-cause question in 
antitrust cases, the courts have used the "direct-indirect" test, which 
requires the plaintiff's injury to be the direct result of the defen-
dant's violation rather than merely the indirect result of an injury 
to a third party. 56 But since this test does no more than substitute 
"direct" for "proximate," it fails to simplify the inquiry.57 Because 
they regard the direct-indirect test as unsatisfactory, some courts 
have developed the "target area" test, which requires that a plaintiff 
be within the general target area at which the seller aimed his vio-
lation. 58 Application of the target area test to a section 3 complaint 
by a terminated dealer might enable the dealer to plead a successful 
cause of action. The test in this context would involve a twofold 
inquiry. A court would first determine whether the harm to the 
plaintiff was of the type the relevant statute was designed to protect: 
in making this determination, the court would examine only the 
particular segment of the economy in which the exclusive-dealing 
arrangements exist. The second stage of the inquiry would involve 
an examination of the plaintiff's relationship with that segment in 
order to determine whether he was within the category of parties 
toward whom the violation was aimed.59 A refused dealer who al-
leges injury resulting from termination of his dealership as part of a 
series of successful exclusive-dealing contracts obviously would ful-
fill the first requirement of the test concerning the type of harm 
that the statute was designed to prevent.60 Moreover, by terminat-
56. See, e.g., Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958); 
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). 
57. See Note, supra note 46, at 165. 
58. See, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955); 
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 
342 U.S. 919 (1952); Pollack, supra note 43, at 18 (listing authority). 
59. Note, supra note 46, at 165. In Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 
358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955), the court likened the test to a target: "Assuming Karseal 
[plaintiff] was 'hit' by the effect of the Richfield antitrust violations, was Karseal 
'aimed at' with enough precision to entitle it to maintain a treble damage suit under 
the Clayton Act?" See also Recent Development, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 543 (1956). 
60. A. NEALE, THE .ANnTRuST LAws OF THE U.S.A. 178-80 (2d ed. 1970). 
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ing dealers as a method of coercing others to comply with a policy 
of exclusive dealing, the seller has aimed his section 3 violations, in 
a very direct manner, at the refused dealer and thus has fulfilled the 
second portion of the test. 
In reviewing the proximate-cause issue, it is clear that a termi-
nated dealer's injury is causally related to a seller's violation of the 
exclusive-dealing prohibition in section 3 of the Clayton Act. The 
Supreme Court has recognized a similar causal relationship between 
a dealer's injury resulting from his termination for refusing to go 
along with a resale price maintenance scheme and a seller's illegal 
price maintenance arrangements with other dealers. Moreover, ap-
plication of the target area test establishes the proximity between a 
terminated dealer's injury and a seller's illegal exclusive-dealing 
agreements with other dealers. It would therefore seem that unless 
a private cause of action under section 3 for terminated dealers is 
inconsistent with the antitrust-law policy, such a cause of action 
should be readily allowed. 
3. A New Analysis 
a. Policy Considerations. The target area test has thus far been 
ignored in the area of exclusive dealing in favor of a more vague 
proximate-cause standard. As a result, terminated dealers have been 
unable to maintain successful causes of action under section 3 of the 
Clayton Act. Because proximate cause is essentially a conclusory 
term used to justify a break made in the chain of causation for pol-
icy reasons, 61 the policies that relate to granting a cause of action to 
refused dealers should be carefully examined. 
Section 4B of the Clayton Act contains a four-year statute of 
limitations for actions brought under section 4 of the Act.62 A 
plaintiff in the position of Campbell Distributing Company, who 
had engaged in exclusive dealing for a long period of time prior to 
cancellation, 63 loses a significant portion of his claim for damages 
unless he is willing and able to bring suit every four years. It has 
also been observed that several factors tend to deter a party to an 
exclusive-dealing agreement from suing during the course of the 
contract.64 However, section 3 of the Clayton Act deals specifically 
with the practice of exclusive dealing and indicates a strong congres-
sional policy against such activity. It is therefore submitted that in 
order to effectuate this policy fully and to maximize the in terrorem 
enforcement effects of the section 4 treble-damage provision, a pri-
vate litigant suing under section 3 should be able to seek redress for 
61. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. 
62, 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1964). 
63. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra. 
64. See text preceding note 17 supra. 
1156 Michigan Law Review [Vol 69:1140 
future damages resulting from his termination as well as for past 
damages incurred during the course of his dealing with the defend-
ant. 
The same policies that prompted adoption of a treble-damage 
remedy compel a broad interpretation of section 3. Section 4 was 
designed to provide for treble rather than single damages in order 
to induce private action and to make such suits a viable deterrent 
to violation of the antitrust laws.65 The courts have recognized such 
a policy66 and scholars have encouraged it.67 Moreover, the reasons 
for encouraging private litigation are convincing. First, government 
activity has long been hamstrung by insufficient funds and person-
nel. 68 It has been estimated that it would require an increase of ap-
propriations to the antitrust divisions of the Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of over four times their 
current budgets to equal the prevailing enforcement effectiveness 
of private litigants.69 In addition, private action· has the advantage 
of involving highly interested and well-informed persons in the gov-
ernment's enforcement efforts; such participation is particularly im-
portant when evidentiary burdens are likely to be extreme.7° Fi-
nally, while private enforcement has a deterrent effect that is likely 
to be substantial when compared to that of government actions, 
which result in relatively small fines71 and, at times, ineffective in-
65. A. NEALE, supra note 60, at 396. 
66. For example, the Supreme Court, in Radovich v. National Football League, 352 
U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957), stated: "Congress has, by legislative fiat, determined that such 
prohibited activities are injurious to the public and has provided sanctions allowing 
private enforcement of the antitrust laws by an aggrieved party. These laws protect 
the victims of the forbidden practises as well as the public." See also Fanchon &: 
Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, 100 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D. Cal. 1951), afld., 215 F.2d 
167 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955), in which a district court said: 
"The treble-damage action was intended not merely to redress injury to an individual 
through the prohibited practices, but to aid in achieving the broad social object of the 
statute." More specifically, the treble recovery was designed to encourage private plain-
tiffs to bring suit, Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947); 
to threaten potential violators with punitive damages, Fanchon & Marco, supra; and to 
compensate those who have been injured by violations, Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal denied per curiam, 337 F.2d 
844 (2d Cir. 1964). 
67. See, e.g., Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 .ANn-
TRUST BULL. 167 (1958); Note, supra note 46. But cf. McConnell, The Treble Damage 
Issue: A Strong Dissent, 50 Nw. U. L. REv. 342 (1955). 
68. Antitrust Law Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust 
Division, Department of Justice, H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51, 75-76 
(1951); Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Develop-
ments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952). 
69. Testimony of Graham H. Morison (former assistant Attorney General in charge 
of the antitrust division), Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly 
Power of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 3408, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1951). 
70. Kessler &: Stern, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 
1, 81 (1959). 
71. Loevinger, supra note 67, at 168-69. 
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junctions, 72 private actions also aim partially at repairing the plain-
tiff's injury. 
In light of such compelling factors,73 it is particularly anomalous 
that the narrow judicial interpretation typically given section 3 re-
sults in a great disparity between the causes of action available to 
the private plaintiff and the public plaintiff. Both the Justice De-
partment74 and the FTC75 have realized a great degree of success in 
suits brought to enjoin the continuation of exclusive-dealing arrange-
ments. 
Thus, in United States v. Sun Oil Company,76 under circum-
72, See, e.g., United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), 
affd, per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952). In that case, after the court issued an injunction 
that prohibited exclusive dealing, the defendant increased the rent on its service 
stations while simultaneously lowering the price of its gas to distributors. As a 
result, dealers were effectively forced to purchase their full requirements of gasoline 
from the defendant. For an example of an equally anomalous result, see Dart Drug 
Corp. v. Parke, Davis&: Co., 344 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1965). After the Justice Department 
had successfully prosecuted Parke, Davis for an illegal resale price maintenance sys-
tem, United States v. Parke, Davis &: Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), Dart Drug brought an 
action for treble damages alleging injury as a result of the refusal-to-deal sanction 
when it failed to acquiesce in Parke, Davis' scheme. The court of appeals held that 
Dart Drug did not have a cause of action because the defendant had merely exercised 
its right unilaterally to refuse to deal. 
73. The policy considerations that favor a liberal interpretation of the statutes 
involved have often been countered with opposing policies. Some of the most com-
mon arguments are the danger of a flood of litigation (see Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910)); the drastic nature of the remedy itself (see Image &: 
Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D. Mass. 1956)); the 
burden that might be placed on industries particularly susceptible to such actions 
(Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), affd., 
211 F.2d 405 (!!d Cir.), cert. denied, !!48 U.S. 828 (1954)); and the possibility that 
a defendant will merely pass the cost of such recoveries on to the consumer. For a 
general discussion of the competing policy factors, see E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE 
DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS §§ !!.01-.02 (1965); Alioto, The Economics of a Treble 
Damage Case, !!2 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 87 (1966); Loevinger, Handling a Plaintiff's 
Antitrust Damage Suit, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 29 (1959). 
74. Under § 14 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1964), the Justice Department 
has the power to sue for injunctive relief against violations of § 3. The United States 
is also granted power through § 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1964), to en-
join similar practices in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). 
Moreover, fine and imprisonment can be levied under § 1 of the Sherman Act and 
§ 14 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1964). 
75. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) possesses a particularly potent weapon 
in § 5 of the Federal Trade Comlnission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), because no con-
tract to sell on condition, agreement, or understanding is required to establish a 
violation of that provision. Although § 5 merely requires proof of unfair methods of 
competition in order to establish a violation, it is directly analogous to § 3 cases 
because of the "incipiency doctrine" under which the courts have found § 5 to em-
brace the Sherman and Clayton Acts and hence to require proof identical to that 
necessary in those two acts. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 
!!92 (1953). But cf. Kessler &: Stern, supra note 70, at 63, suggesting a much broader 
interpretation of § 5. 
76, 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959). See also Standard Oil Co. of California &: 
Standard Stations, Inc. v. United States, !!!!7 U.S. 293 (1949); United States v. United 
Shoe Mach, Co., 2!!4 F. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1916); United States v. Richfield Oil 
ll58 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:1140 
stances almost identical to those in the Nelson case, a violation of 
section 3 was found. The defendant in Sun Oil was an integrated 
oil company that produced and sold gasoline to numerous indepen-
dent dealers. As a matter of policy, the company refused to enter 
into a sales agreement unless the dealer orally or tacitly agreed to 
handle only the defendant's gasoline and sponsored products. At 
least one instance was cited by the plaintiff in which the sanction had 
in fact been applied. After examining the entire scheme, the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found a clear viola-
tion of section 3 and issued an injunction.77 Similarly, in Butterick 
Company v. FTC,78 the court upheld an FTC order compelling 
defendant manufacturer to cease and desist conduct that required 
dealers in its standard garment patterns to deal exclusively, which 
requirement was enforced through refusals to deal and threats of 
such refusals. 79 
It may be argued that the tw-o categories of litigants can be dis-
tinguished on the basis of remedies-the government seeks an in-
junction while a private party seeks damages. Yet such a distinction 
is untenable because the crucial element-proximate cause-in re-
ality is almost identical: the government alleges injury to the pub-
lic in general as the basis of its claim, while the terminated dealer 
alleges injury to himself. Both claims, however, are dependent upon 
proof that the defendant and his distributors are illegally involved 
in exclusive dealing. There is no reason to hold that the injury to 
the general public is more "proximately" caused by this violation 
than is the injury to the terminated dealer since neither party is di-
rectly involved in the scheme. Indeed, injury to the terminated 
dealer seems more logically sustainable because the dealer's termina-
tion is a part of the seller's over-all scheme. This argument is bol-
stered by the treble-damages provision, which indicates a congres-
sional policy to equate the public and private plaintiffs with regard 
to enforcement of section 3.80 Nevertheless, the Nelson court inter-
preted section 3 as applying different standards to different plain-
tiffs and thereby frustrated the policy of Congress. 
Besides these specific arguments, it should be emphasized that 
the policy of antitrust law generally favors a more liberal view of 
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd. per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952). But cf. 
United States v. J.I. Case Co., IOI F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951). 
77. 176 F. Supp. at 739. 
78. 4 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1925). See also Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. FTC, 299 F.2d 
839 (6th Cir. 1962); Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940); 
Pearsall Butter Co. v. FTC, 292 F. 720 (7th Cir. 1923). 
79. As both Sun Oil and Butterick suggest, it is often significant that a defendant 
in a § 3 suit used the threat of refusal to deal in order to obtain adherence to his 
unlawful arrangement. 
80. See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text. 
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the rights of a private plaintiff. In a comprehensive study of the pol-
icy of the antitrust laws, Kaysen and Turner have suggested that 
there are four possible alternative goals for antitrust policy based on 
past analysis and current needs: (1) performance, (2) limitation of 
the power of big business, (3) fair dealing, and (4) protection of 
competitive processes by limiting undue market power.81 Of the 
four goals, the authors chose the fourth-protection of competition 
-as the most desirable and feasible.82 If that choice is correct, it 
provides a strong case for granting a cause of action to the refused 
dealer. The case is further enhanced by the authors' definition of 
market power: "A firm possesses market power when it can behave 
persistently in a manner different from the behavior that a competi-
tive market would enforce on a firm facing otherwise similar cost 
and demand situations.''83 The refusal-to-deal sanction is not an ef-
fective means of power unless it is a meaningful threat. In order for 
the threat to be meaningful, the seller must have enough alternative 
sources of distribution available or enough dealers willing to coop-
erate so that he will not commit economic suicide by threatening 
the sanction on all his dealers. Thus, the very fact that he is able to 
refuse to deal with the plaintiff should present a prima facie case of 
market power. The same reasoning illustrates the harm that such 
conduct causes the competitive process: if the dealer acquiesces, 
harm to the competitive relationship between the seller and his 
competitors is implicit in the arrangement; on the other hand, if he 
refuses and is terminated while other dealers acquiesce, he becomes 
a cog in the seller's broader plan to achieve exclusive dealing, since 
his example makes the threat of termination more meaningful to 
others. Either result is equally harmful to the competitive process.84 
Even if protection of competition is not the paramount goal of 
antitrust policy, at least two of the other goals suggested by Kaysen 
and Turner-limitation on the power of big business and fair deal-
ing-would favor upholding the refused dealer's case. By destroying 
the seller's ability to refuse to deal as a part of an exclusive dealing 
policy, a terminated dealer's private action under section 3 furthers 
the policy of limiting the power of big business. 85 Moreover, the 
81. C. KAYSEN &: D. TURNER, .ANTITRUST POLICY 11-23 (1959). 
82. Id. at 44. 
83. Id. at 75. 
84. The purposes of § 3 are viewed in a broader manner, thus strengthening 
the argument in favor of the refused dealer, in ArroRNEY GENERAL NATL, COMM. ON 
ANTITRUST I.Aw, REPORT 130 (1955): "[C]ourts have viewed the Clayton Act's specific 
prohibitions [as] designed to prevent anticompetitive business practices which would 
result in unreasonable restraints." 
85. The decision whether "big," as opposed to "small,'' business is involved in a 
particular case could be made by determining whether a violation of § 3 caused a 
"substantial lessening of competition" or tendency "to create a monopoly." See note 7 
supra. 
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use of coercive tactics in an attempt to force unwilling parties to 
violate the law cannot reasonably be termed "fair dealing." The fi-
nal goal, performance, may, however, favor disallowing a cause of 
action. Although traditional economic theory teaches that the closer 
pure competition is approximated, the more performance and effi-
ciency will be promoted, 86 it is more realistic to assume that the 
predictability and stability provided by systems of exclusive-dealing 
contracts are more conducive to efficiency.87 Nevertheless, since the 
other basic goals of antitrust law-protection of competition, limi-
tation of the power of big business, and fair dealing-would all be 
furthered by the allowance of causes of action for terminated deal-
ers, it is clear that such claims have a strong basis in policy. 
b. The Emerging Trend. The decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Nelson Radio &- Supply 
Company v. Motorola88 was for years the principal authority relied 
upon by courts in denying causes of action to refused dealers.80 An 
explicit statement to the contrary has been offered only by the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which has stood alone in consistently and 
unequivocally recognizing such a claim.90 However, recent decisions 
in several other circuits indicate a trend away from the Nelson logic 
and in favor of expanding the rights of terminated dealers. Even 
the Fourth Circuit, in the case of Amplex of Maryland v. Outboard 
Marine Corporation,91 has shown signs of moving toward the adap-
tation of a more flexible approach.92 
Amplex had dealt for several years in the outboard motors and 
accessories sold by Outboard Marine when it opened a branch store 
removed from its central location. When Amplex began selling a com-
86. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 41 (7th ed. 1967). 
87. Kessler & Stern, supra note 70, at 21. See also note 1 supra. For a compre-
hensive analysis of the role of efficiency in antitrust law, see Bork, The Rule of Reason 
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966). 
88. 200 F.2d 91 I (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). 
89. See pt. IT. B. 1. supra. 
90. See Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964): Englander 
Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959). In the Alles case, the 
plaintiff alleged that it had distributed the defendant's staplers pursuant to an 
agreement terminable by either party on sixty days notice. It also alleged that an im-
plied term of the agreement was that the plaintiff would not sell products of the 
defendant's competitors. When the plaintiff began selling staplers produced by other 
manufacturers, the defendant threatened to terminate the distributorship agreement 
and ultimately exercised its option to do so. The court of appeals stated rather tersely 
that "the complaint states a cause of action under Section 3 of the Clayton Act." 329 
F .2d at 570. The Englander Motors case gives a similarly brief treatment to the § !I 
issue. 
91. 380 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, !189 U.S. 1036 (1968). 
92. See also Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), petition 
for rehearing denied, 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1961), for a tying case in which the re-
fused dealer was found to have a valid claim. But cf. McElhenney Co. v. Western 
Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, !165 U.S. 834 (1960). 
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petitive line of motors in the branch, the defendant first threatened 
to cancel and then did cancel the plaintiff's distributorship. The 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal under section 1 
of the Sherman Act, but went on to discuss the ramifications of sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act. The court found the cancellation in this 
case to be merely a unilateral refusal to deal.93 However, the court 
stressed the fact that the plaintiff had alleged only one such refusal 
and it implied that had the plaintiff shown that the termination of 
its dealership was part of an over-all policy of exclusive dealing with 
a number of dealers, achieved through coercive tactics, it would 
have demonstrated the existence of a valid case.04 
The Ninth Circuit also appears to be shifting from the Nelson 
position. In Leo ]. Meyberg Company v. Eureka Williams Corpora-
tion,9r, the plaintiff was allegedly terminated as a distributor of the 
defendant's vacuum cleaners because he refused to deal on an ex-
clusive basis. In a per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case.06 However, 
in the later case of Lessig v. Tidewater,91 the court indicated a 
change in its position. Lessig was a service station lessee and a dealer 
in the defendant's products. He operated under a contract, exten-
sively used by the defendant, that required dealers to purchase all 
of their petroleum products from the Tidewater Oil Company. In 
his suit, Lessig alleged that periodic inspections of his inventory, 
threats of cancellation, and a system of rebates were used to insure 
the cooperation of the plaintiff and of other dealers involved in the 
exclusive-dealing arrangement and a system of resale price mainte-
93. The court stated: 
Plaintiff's evidence, adduced and proffered, showed but one refusal by Outboard to 
deal upon a dealer's failure to drop a competitive line; that was the cancellation, 
or non-renewal, of plaintiff's own franchise; there was no evidence that the dis-
enfranchisement of Amplex was held out threateningly as a deterrent to other 
dealers; there was no evidence of any combination or conspiracy linking Out-
board to its competitors or other dealers •••• 
[T]he proof shows no more than a unilateral refusal to deal. 
380 F.2d at 114-15. 
94. In an amicus brief, the Justice Department supported the plaintiff in its peti-
tion for certiorari. The Justice Department took the position that a refusal to deal 
is actionable by a private plaintiff when it has been used in an attempt to gain 
adherence to an exclusive-dealing arrangement that would, if agreed to, be merely 
one of a number of such contracts that could substantially lessen competition or tend 
to create a monopoly. Brief for the Justice Department as Amicus Curiae, Amplex of 
Maryland, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 389 U.S. 1036 (1968) (denying cert. to 380 
F.2d ll2 (4th Cir. 1967)). 
95. 215 F .2d 100 (9th Cir. 1954). 
96. The court observed, "Prior to July, 1952, the contract between the parties did 
not forbid appellant [plaintiff] to deal in products of a competitor of appellee. After 
July, 1952, there was no contract, lease or sale between the parties at all. It is manifest 
that there could be no violation of said section 3 by entering into an illegal lease, sale 
or contract." 215 F.2d at IOI. 
97. 327 F.2d 454 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). 
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nance and tying. Although not expressly overruling Leo ]. Mey-
berg,98 the court cast doubt upon that case's continuing validity 
when it held: 
The court's instructions conditioned recovery upon a finding that 
Lessig entered into an exclusive dealing or tying arrangement with 
Tidewater. But Lessig's charge was broader; he also alleged that 
Tidewater sought to impose these arrangements upon all his dealers. 
If Lessig proved damages to himself from such a course of conduct-
for example, by cancellation of his lease and dealer contract because 
he refused to become a party to a system of illegal exclusive dealing 
and tying arrangements-we see no reason why he could not recover . 
. . . Doubt has been raised that proximate cause can be shown where 
only the Clayton Act is offended, but we believe the distinction un-
tenable. . . . Since it is the entire system of conditions and under-
standings which violates the Clayton Act, injury to a dealer result-
ing from Tidewater's efforts to establish and maintain that system is 
injury "by reason of" conduct forbidden by the Act.99 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit seems to have recognized the possibility 
that a terminated dealer may be proximately injured by a system of 
exclusive contracts between the defendant-seller and other dealers. 
Although the district courts remain at odds,100 particularly in those 
jurisdictions where a case has not yet reached the appellate courts, 
it is apparent that the courts are becoming increasingly liberal in 
construing the requirements for a valid cause of action by a termi-
nated dealer, particularly when the plaintiff can show that the re-
fusal was not unilateral but part of a broader policy of exclusive 
dealing of the seller involving other dealers. 
The Supreme Court indicated its concurrence with this trend in 
its recent decision in Albrecht v. Herald Company.101 Albrecht was 
a distributor of the defendant's newspapers whose dealership had 
been terminated for his failure to abide by a resale price mainte-
nance scheme.102 Before resorting to termination, the defendant had 
98. Rather than overrule Leo J. Meyberg, the court chose to distinguish it on the 
ground that plaintiff's claim in the latter case was narrower. Lessig alleged that 
defendant sought to impose these arrangements upon all of his dealers and that Les-
sig's cancellation was part of the over-all coercive conduct to effectuate the plan. 327 
F.2d at 472. 
99. 327 F.2d at 472-73 (footnotes omitted). 
100. Compare Reliable Volkswagen Sales &: Serv. Co., Inc. v. World-Wide 
Automobile Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412 (D.N.J. 1960) (court refused to grant summary 
judgment for the defendant on the ground that a terminated dealer was not em-
braced by §§ 3 and 4, although summary judgment was granted for the defendant 
when the plaintiff failed to show a substantial lessening of competition), with Campbell 
Distrib. Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1962) (no cause of 
action). 
101. 390 U.S. 145 (1968). See also Comment, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 
HARv. L. REv. 254 (1968); Note, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 862 (1969); Recent Development, 37 
U. CIN. L. REv. 411 (1968). 
102. On the illegality of such schemes, see note 39 supra. 
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attempted to coerce the plaintiff into acquiescence by enlisting the 
aid of a salesman to solicit plaintiff's customers and of another 
dealer to deliver newspapers to those customers who were willing to 
discontinue their subscriptions with the plaintiff. The district court 
entered judgment for the defendant in the plaintiff's suit under 
section I of the Sherman Act, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed on 
the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of an ille-
gal combination. In reversing, the Supreme Court first found the 
requisite combination to exist between the defendant and the sales-
man and other dealer.103 Significantly, it went on to say that the 
plaintiff could also have brought a successful suit by alleging injury 
as a result of the defendant's combination with other dealers based 
on the system of resale price maintenance agreements.104 By so stat-
ing, the Court presumably felt that the terminated dealer was in-
deed embraced by the proximate-cause requirement of section 4. 
It should be apparent that recent cases involving exclusive deal-
ing and analogous antitrust violations have reappraised the rights of 
the terminated dealer. Decisions in these cases have indicated a will-
ingness to recognize a dealer's claim when his termination was part 
of an over-all plan of exclusive dealing involving other dealers. Im-
plicit in such a rationale is a construction of the sale-or-contract-for-
sale requirement of section 3 and the proximate-cause requirement 
of section 4 in a manner more consistent with the purposes of these 
sections. 
III. REQUIREMENT OF A CONDffiON, 
AGREEMENT, OR UNDERSTANDING 
I£ he survives the procedural barrier of alleging a contract or 
sale, a private plaintiff ordinarily should have little difficulty estab-
lishing the requisite condition, agreement, or understanding that 
the purchasers not deal in the goods of a competitor of the seller. 
It has long been recognized by the federal courts that the condition, 
agreement, or understanding may be oral or tacit or merely implied 
from a course of conduct.105 The most common form of evidence is 
103. The Supreme Court presented a unique discussion of the term "combination." 
Typically, a combination or conspiracy has involved competitors or intermediaries 
within the chain of distribution who benefited from the illegal scheme. See, e.g., 
United States v. Bausch &: Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); FTC v. Beech-Nut 
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). But the Court in Albrecht held that it was irrelevant 
that the two other parties involved in the defendant's scheme had no interest in the 
arrangement-other than the economic benefits that accrued from performing their 
normal services-if they had been enlisted in the plan and had some knowledge of 
the defendant's purpose. 390 U.S. at 150. 
104. 390 U.S. at 154. On remand, the district court accepted the Court's rationale 
and granted damages in favor of defendant. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 1971 Trade Cas. 
89,868 (E.D. Mo. 1970). 
105. See, e.g., Lessig v. Tidewater, 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 
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proof of coercion by the seller in imposing such terms in the sales 
agreement, and proof is not required that the dealer voluntarily ac-
quiesced in the terms.106 It matters not that the defendant used the 
ruse of agency consignment or other such contract, because the 
court will look to the substance and not the form of such arrange-
ments.107 It also appears to be clear from Albrecht v. Herald Com-
pany that if the alleged agreement or understanding was made with 
third parties, it need not be shmvn that these other parties received 
any benefit from the illegal arrangement.108 
It should be noted that section 3 may not require any oral, tacit, 
or other agreement concerning exclusive dealing between the par-
ties, because section 3 declares illegal a contract or sale on the con-
dition that the dealer not handle competitive goods. A condition is 
generally defined as "A future and uncertain event upon the hap-
pening of which is made to depend the existence of an obligation . 
. . . "109 Prior to its fulfillment, a condition is a unilateral require-
ment imposed by the seller, and no acquiescence by the dealer is 
required in order to show its existence. Thus, the term has a very 
different substantive content from the terms "agreement" and "un-
derstanding," which denote bilateral conduct. Since section 3 of the 
Clayton Act was drafted to deal specifically with certain offenses 
that were not previously dealt with under the Sherman Act,11° the 
unilateral quality of a condition becomes even more significant in 
U.S. 993 (1964); Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964); United 
States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), afjd. per curiam, 343 
U.S. 922 (1952). In McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332, 338 
(4th Cir. 1959), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed: "Probably nothing is 
more firmly settled in our antitrust jurisprudence than that an illegal contract may be 
inferred from all the circumstances .••• [T]he [contract in question] could be supple• 
mented by an extrinsic course of conduct from which the illegal condition or under-
standing might be found." 
106. United States v. Sun Oil Co., 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959). See also Mc-
Elhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1959), in which the 
court said at 338: "It makes no difference whether this is voluntary or is imposed by 
coercion, but without such agreement, condition or understanding, there can be no 
statutory infraction." 
107. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (violation of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act found when defendant attempted to fix prices of gasoline distributors 
under consignment contracts); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) 
(agency label does not protect price-fixing scheme from § 1 of the Sherman Act); United 
States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd. per curiam, 343 U.S. 
922 (1952) (agency ruled out as a defense in Clayton Act § 3 case when such an agree-
ment in fact did not exist); Johnson. The Role of Agency and Sale in Antitrust: Gen-
eral Electric, Simpson, Schwinn, 53 MINN. L. R.Ev. 57 (1968). 
108. 390 U.S. at 150. 
109. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 365 (4th rev. ed. 1968). 
110. The preamble to the original Clayton bill explained that its purpose was "to 
prohibit certain trade practises which .•• singly and in themselves are not covered 
by the [Sherman Act] •••• "A.NEALE, THE ANTITRusr LAws OF THE U.S.A. 178 (2d ed. 
1970). 
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light of the fact that section I of the Sherman Act deals with bilat-
eral action.111 Thus, the terminated dealer in a typical case, such as 
Nelson,iu should be able to argue successfully that, prior to termi-
nation, goods had been sold to him on the condition that he deal 
exclusively with the seller and that it was only after he accepted 
those goods and refused to abide by the accompanying condition 
that he was canceled. In this manner, the requirement of a sale on 
condition may be fulfilled and the plaintiff may allege a valid cause 
of action.113 Since the precise issue has not yet arisen,114 it is unclear 
whether the courts will interpret the term "condition" in this sense. 
In any event, a dealer who has been terminated pursuant to an ex-
clusive-dealing scheme should encounter little difficulty establishing 
a condition, agreement, or understanding that purchasers not deal 
in the goods of the seller's competitors. 
Once the courts recognize a valid cause of action for terminated 
dealers under section 3 of the Clayton Act, it does not automatically 
follow that sellers will be stripped of their rights to exercise inde-
pendent business discretion in choosing dealers or that sellers pes-
tered by numerous small claims will be forced to settle essentially 
invalid claims. The doctrine of United States v. Colgate,115 which 
gives the seller a right unilaterally to refuse to deal,116 has been pre-
111. The section declares illegal contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in re-
straint of trade, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). 
112. See discussion in pt. II. B. 1. supra. 
118. Carried to its logical extreme, this argument concerning "condition" has much 
broader implications. Consider, for example, the framework established with respect 
to proximate cause in the text accompanying notes 51-52 supra. Assume that seller 
XYZ distributes its products through dealers A, B, and C. It was shown that as soon 
as A, B, or C acquiesced in an exclusive-dealing arrangement, another dealer who had 
been terminated could then establish proximate cause, regardless of whether he knew 
of the acquiescence. Use of the term "condition" in § 3, however, suggests that proxi-
mate cause can be established at an earlier stage of XYZ's plan. Assume that XYZ 
makes simultaneous sales to A, B, and C on the condition that they deal exclusively 
with him. The condition is unilateral since A, B, and C do not agree to it. None of 
the three dealers abides by the condition, and XYZ thereafter refuses to deal with 
A. According to a literal interpretation of § 8, XYZ has thus violated the Act 
by making a sale on the condition that its distributors deal exclusively with it, even 
though none actually honored his wishes. Moreover, because termination of A was 
part of a plan to coerce B and C to acquiesce in the arrangement, A should be able 
to fulfill the proximate-cause requirement of § 4 and recover damages for his termina-
tion. 
114. The closest a court has come to isolating the three terms was in Lessig v. 
Tidewater, 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964), in which the 
court of appeals briefly spoke solely in terms of "condition," 327 F.2d at 465, 468. 
115. 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
116. The Court there held: "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain 
a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manu-
facturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own discretion 
as to parties with whom he will deal, And, of course, he may announce in advance the 
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell." 250 U.S. at 307. 
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served, although in a modified form.117 It has even been suggested 
that the very reason for preserving the Colgate doctrine is to pro-
vide the lower courts with a tool for dismissing frivolous treble-
damage actions.118 In any event, proof of a "condition, agreement or 
understanding" is an evidentiary requirement that serves exactly 
the same purpose-preserving the right of sellers to refuse to deal 
for reasons that do not violate the antitrust laws. Such a right is il-
lustrated in Timken Roller Bearing Company v. FTC.119 In that 
case, defendant Timken engaged in a policy of urging dealers to 
show loyalty by devoting themselves primarily to the resale of Tim-
ken bearings. The plaintiff testified that he had been terminated be-
cause he dealt in competitive products. However, other dealers testi-
fied that they felt free to deal in competitive goods and actually did 
so. Since no condition, agreement, or understanding had been 
117. The sweeping language of Colgate was modified by a series of subsequent deci-
sions: United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1919); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy 
Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1920); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co,, 257 U.S. 441 (1921); 
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1943). However, the crown-
ing blow was not delivered until United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1959). 
In that case, Parke, Davis engaged in an active program of maintaining resale prices of 
retailers and utilized a variety of tactics. It published a catalogue with "suggested" re-
tail prices. Retailers and wholesalers were orally induced to abide by such prices and 
were encouraged to report violators. The most potent economic weapon utilized by 
Parke, Davis, according to the Court, was the threat of refusal to deal with either retail• 
ers who failed to observe the suggested minimum prices or wholesalers who deal with 
such dealers. 362 U.S. at 45-46. While cautiously avoiding expressly overruling Colgate, 
the Court found a violation of § I of the Sherman Act, because it concluded that 
Parke, Davis had gone beyond a mere unilateral refusal to deal and had applied tactics 
that effectuated adherence to its illegal policies and resulted in a combination between 
it and the wholesalers. 362 U.S. at 46-47. In other words, when a seller, in a totally 
isolated case or a series of isolated cases, refuses to deal with a distributor for any 
reason, Colgate protects his independent discretion from prosecution under the anti-
trust laws. But the Court indicated that a seller is subject to prosecution when he 
uses the threat of refusal to deal as a method of assuring compliance to a scheme vio-
lative of the antitrust laws and as a result suppresses competition. 362 U.S. at 47. 
The Parke, Davis decision and previous decisions have produced a substantial con-
troversy whether Colgate retains any significance today. See, e.g., Adams-Mitchell Co. v. 
Cambridge Distrib. Co., 189 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion arguing that 
if Colgate is not already overruled, it should be); Pitofsky & Dam, Is the Colgate Doc-
trine Dead?, 37 A.B.A. ANTITRusr L.J. 772 (1968); Note, Unilateral Refusals to Deal: King 
Colgate is Dead!, 30 Omo ST. L.J. 537 (1969). But cf. Fulda, Individual Refusal To Deal: 
When Does Single Firm Conduct Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 I.Aw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 
590 (1966); Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious 
Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 655 (1962): Weisbard, Resale Price 
Maintenance, Exclusive Dealing and Tying Arrangements, IO ANTITRusr BuLL. 341 
(1965). But regardless of the theoretical debate concerning its significance, the Colgate 
doctrine continues to be applied by the courts today, particularly in the area of ex-
clusive dealing. Pitofsky & Dam, supra at 782-83. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing 
Co. v. FTC, 299 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1962); McElhenny Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 
269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 834 (1960); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. 
v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). 
118. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious 
Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962). 
119. 299 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1962). See also United States v. J.I. Case Co., IOI F. Supp. 
856 (D. Minn. 1951). 
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shown, the court affirmed a verdict that was entered in defendant's 
favor on the ground that "a seller has the right to select his own 
customers. "120 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE: THE SHERMAN Acr 
The preceding discussion sought to show that a private plaintiff, 
injured as a result of an exclusive-dealing arrangement, should be 
able to seek redress under section 3 of the Clayton Act. Alternative 
theories of relief, however, may be suggested. The most likely pos-
sibility would be suit under section I of the Sherman Act.121 That 
section declares contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in re-
straint of trade to be illegal. The same policy arguments that favor 
granting a cause of action to terminated dealers for violations of 
section 3 of the Clayton Act-such as protection of competition and 
inducement of private suits to deter antitrust violations-support 
the allowance of similar claims under section I of the Sherman 
Act.122 The similarity between the two sections is further reflected 
by the fact that private litigants suing pursuant to section 3 have 
usually also alleged violations of section 1. Similarly, when no viola-
tion of the Clayton Act provision is found, because the requirement 
of a sale on condition is not present, the courts have refused to find a 
violation of the Sherman Act on the ground that no contract, combi-
nation, or conspiracy exists.123 
While exclusive-dealing arrangements may be found to violate 
either section I of the Sherman Act124 or section 3 of the Clayton 
Act, offenses under the different provisions involve different proce-
dural and substantive factors. Moreover, even when identical consid-
erations would appear to be involved, as in the case of the causation 
requirement under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the courts have 
120. 299 F .2d at 842. 
121. 15 U.S.C. § I (1964). Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), will 
not be considered since, although available, it is based on monopoly power that results 
from vertical integration rather than exclusive dealing per se. 
More radical and less feasible suggestions have also been made. For a discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages of reading the words "offer" or "attempt" into § 3 
of the Clayton Act or of amending the statute itself, see Kessler &: Stern, supra note 
70, at 114-16. See also Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11, 15 
(6th Cir. 1959), in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated a willingness to 
read "attempt" into § 3. In that case, a terminated dealer was held to have stated a 
valid claim against a defendant who used short-term cancellation provisions a:; a 
means of coercing compliance to exclusive-dealing arrangements. 
122. See notes 61-72 supra and accompanying text. 
123. See, e.g., Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959); 
Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); 
Nelson Radio&: Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 
!45 U.S. 925 (1953). 
124. See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); A. NEALE, supra 
note 110, at 151, 
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frequently applied different standards to cases brought under the 
respective acts. For example, under either act, a private litigant is 
given standing to sue by section 4 of the Clayton Act. Yet the courts 
have inexplicably tended to be much more liberal in finding proxi-
mate cause when a Sherman Act offense, such as resale price main-
tenance, is involved.125 It is possible that such liberality will be ex-
tended to the area of exclusive dealing and thus improve the plight 
of the terminated dealer. 
One of the significant distinctions in the nature of the exclusive-
dealing offense under the two acts lies in what has been called the 
substantive, or economic, test. An exclusive arrangement is illegal 
under section 3 whenever a not insubstantial amount of commerce 
in the product is involved or when the seller's economic power with 
respect to the exclusive product is sufficient to produce an appreci-
able restraint on trade.126 To satisfy the economic test under the 
Sherman Act, on the other hand, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
both elements must be present.127 Nevertheless, since the dual re-
quirements were first promulgated, the Court has gradually lessened 
the market power requirement through a series of Sherman Act de-
cisions culminating in Fortner Enterprises, Incorporated v. United 
States Steel Corporation.128 In Fortner, a case involving an illegal 
tie-in of the purchase of prefabricated houses for the development 
of two tracts of land and the financing of the purchase, the Court 
suggested that it might be willing to eliminate the market power 
criterion in section 1 cases.129 Several lower-court decisions have also 
indicated a willingness to apply the Clayton Act economic test to 
cases arising under section 1 of the Sherman Act.180 If such a 
trend continues, the substantive burden of bringing suit under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act will be alleviated and the refused dealer 
may find that section 1 provides a more desirable route for his claim 
than does section 3 of the Clayton Act. 
125. See, e.g., A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1959), cert. 
denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960); Halper, Individual Refusals To Deal: Customer Selection 
or Dealer Protection, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 49, 59 (1963). But cf. Klein v. Ameri-
can Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963). 
126. See note 7 supra. 
127. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). See also 
Lessig v. Tidewater, 327 F.2d 454 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). 
128. 394 U.S. 495 (1969). See also United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962): 
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 
CORNELL L. R.Ev. 161, 162 (1970). 
129. 394 U.S. at 499-501. See also Handler, supra note 128, at 163. 
130. See, e.g., Advance Business Sys. Supply Co. v. S.C.M. Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 62 (4th 
Cir. 1969), in which the court said: "[A] seller's successful imposition of a tying arrange-
ment on a substantial amount of commerce may be taken as proof of his economic 
power over the tying product;" Seigal v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 1970 Trade Cas. 88,505, 
88,508 (N.D. Cal. 1970), in which the court said: "[T]his court is of the opinion that 
any distinction between the Sherman Act and Clayton Act with regard to the question 
of market power is wholly artificial." 
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Although the economic test may be more difficult under sec-
tion I, the other elements of a section I claim should be much easier 
for a plaintiff to establish than the elements of a claim under sec-
tion 3. In order to show that a violation of section 3 has occurred, a 
plaintiff must prove the existence of a sale or contract to sell and of 
a condition, agreement, or understanding. Under section I of the 
Sherman Act, the plaintiff need only establish the presence of a con-
tract, conspiracy. or combination. The terms "combination" or 
"conspiracy" in section I significantly enhance a plaintiff's chances 
of pleading a valid claim, since the Supreme Court has long recog-
nized the possibility of a vertical-horizontal combination or con-
spiracy between a seller and other dealers131 and, in recent years, has 
expanded the scope of these two terms.132 
Although the section I cause of action would present significant 
advantages to the refused dealer in establishing his claim, one im-
portant disadvantage should be noted. Section 3 of the Clayton Act 
declares illegal a sale or contract to sell. Thus, by utilizing the sales 
to other dealers as a basis for the violation, the refused dealer estab-
lishes a claim against the seller only; other dealers are not liable, 
since they merely bought or contracted to buy. Since no similar re-
striction exists in section I of the Sherman Act, a refused dealer 
would be able to sue other dealers as well as the seller. Although 
this result might technically further the policy of the law against 
exclusive dealing, it would appear to be an overly harsh measure in 
the typical situation where the other dealers were coerced into an 
exclusive-buying arrangement. This very problem may have influ-
enced the courts in disallowing claims to terminated dealers pur-
suant to section I, although such reasoning is not apparent from the 
cases. It would appear, however, that when the ultimate decision is 
faced, construction of a judicial doctrine under section I of the 
Sherman Act that does or does not encompass the acquiescing dealer 
in the range of liability must depend upon the availability of sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act as a more specific alternative and a weigh-
ing of the policies and equities involved in the particular section I 
suit.1sa 
131. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). The vertical-
horizontal combination or conspiracy has not yet been recognized in the area of 
exclusive dealing, however. Similarly, the courts have been unwilling to grant a cause 
of action to the refused dealer on the basis of a group boycott theory. The group 
boycott theory would be a useful one for plaintiffs, because a group boycott is a per 
se violation of the antitrust laws. Barber, Refusals To Deal under the Antitrust Laws, 
103 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 847, 872-77 (1955). 
132. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), discussed in text accom-
panying notes 101-04 supra; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). See 
generally Turner, supra note 117. 
l!l3. A device that would avoid implicating other dealers, while establishing a 
violation by the seller, might be the expanding doctrine of intracorporate conspiracy. 
It is well established that a conspiracy can be found when one part of a corporate 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the applicability of section 1 of the Sherman Act 
to private remedies for exclusive dealing, it is the thrust of this 
Comment that terminated dealers should be granted a cause of ac-
tion under section 3 of the Clayton Act. In reaching this conclusion, 
it was shown that section 4 of the Clayton Act encourages private 
plaintiffs to enforce the antitrust laws when they have incurred in-
jury as a result of a forbidden act. But although the federal govern-
ment has consistently succeeded in prosecuting sellers for violating 
the provisions of section 3 by written, oral, or tacit exclusive agree-
ments, the interpretation given sections 3 and 4 in N elson134 and 
many subsequent decisions has permitted sellers to employ the 
refusal-to-deal sanction-a very effective sort of power-to violate 
the antitrust laws while remaining immune from section 4 suits.135 
Such an interpretation is not only contrary to the policy behind 
sections 3 and 4 and the antitrust laws in general, but it also creates 
an obvious inconsistency in enforcement of the law. 
Section 3 does not expressly require that the sale or contract to 
family conspires with another-for example, a conspiracy between a parent corporation 
and a wholly owned subsidiary. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &: Sons, ll40 
U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). However, due to the infrequent appearance of such 
corporate structures in the area of exclusive dealing, such a doctrine provides little help 
to the refused dealer. 
A related theory that might be helpful to the refused dealer involves the concept 
of a conspiracy formed among the officers and the corporation itself. The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Nelson case found this theory to be "absurd": "It is 
basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or entities to have a 
conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than a private 
individual, and it is the general rule that the acts of an agent are the acts of a 
corporation." 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952). It has been suggested, however, that the 
doctrine of respondeat superior can be applied to establish the conspiracy. Under this 
line of reasoning, each corporate officer involved in the establishment of exclusive 
agreements is responsible, as an individual, for his acts. Moreover, such activity is 
attributable to the corporation as well, because it is responsible for the acts of its 
agents. Hence, when a corporation and its officers embark on an exclusive-dealing 
program, the corporation may be held for conspiracy in restraint of trade. Kessler &: 
Stern, supra note 70, at 88-89. At least two countervailing arguments have thus far been 
successfully applied to prevent this analysis. First, a doctrine of intracorporate con-
spiracy would effectively replace § 1 with a naked restraint-of-trade doctrine. See Note, 
Dealer Recovery for Unreasonable Refusals To Deal Under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, 53 CoRNELL L. REv. 720, 733 (1968). And second, the proposed doctrine would 
usurp the function of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), which was drafted 
specifically to deal with such restraints. 
134. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra. 
135. The problem is succinctly stated in P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN lNTRoDUC· 
TORY ANALYSIS 502 (7th ed. 1967): 
As we have seen, the economist and the lawyer do not always see eye to eye. The 
economist often feels that lawyers and the courts have concentrated on the letter 
of the law, without defining its spirit with any precision. If a businessman should 
be caught with an indiscreet set of letters in his files, the court throws the book at 
him. But if another company has consistently done the same thing in less overt 
fashion, it is immune from prosecution. 
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sell on a condition, agreement, or understanding be with any spe-
cific party. Yet by finding that proximate cause is not fulfilled unless 
the arrangement involves the plaintiff, the Nelson court effectively 
read such a requirement into the Clayton Act and thereby seriously 
limited the efficacy of the exclusive-dealing prohibition. It is sub-
mitted that a plaintiff should not be required to show that he was 
a party to a sale or contract to sell in order to establish a valid cause 
of action, as long as the actions directed toward the plaintiff were 
part of an over-all policy of exclusive dealing. Similarly, it should 
be unnecessary for the plaintiff to show that he was aware of the 
cooperation of other dealers. To state a valid claim, the plaintiff 
should only be required to show that one other dealer was, in fact, 
involved in the scheme. The courts are beginning to recognize that 
allowing the refused dealer a comprehensive cause of action is con-
sistent with the basic antitrust policies of protecting competition, 
competitors, and the discretion of individual dealers. Such interpre-
tation is likely to be expanded, particularly in light of recent Su-
preme Court decisions in related areas. Yet the increased liberality 
accorded the terminated dealer will not destroy the right of a seller 
independently to exercise sound business discretion, because this 
right is safeguarded by the necessity of proving an illegal condition, 
agreement, or understanding and by the Colgate doctrine.136 In sum, 
by fully utilizing section 3 of the Clayton Act as a basis for private 
causes of action, the courts could implement the policy of the anti-
trust laws and provide remedies for terminated dealers injured by 
illegal exclusive-dealing arrangements while not unduly infringing 
the freedom of manufacturers and distributors. 
186. See notes 115-18 supra and accompanying text. 
